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CHARTING SUPREME COURT PATENT LAW, NEAR AND FAR 
JOSEPH SCOTT MILLER* 
I would not care to match wits with Seth Waxman, one of the leading 
Supreme Court advocates practicing in the United States today.1 I am will-
ing, however, to proffer an epigram I find no less fitting than the one with 
which he began.2 Mine: “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose”—the 
more it changes, the more it’s the same thing.3 When we take a longer view 
of the Supreme Court’s opinions in patent cases and other intellectual prop-
erty law cases, we can see vital continuities that run through this body of 
judge-made law, binding it together in a stable fabric. It is a longer view that 
I offer here, based on a citation study of cases that uses network-analysis 
metrics and force-mapping data visualization tools.4 I examine the 1947–
2017 span, as well as the half-spans from 1947 to 1982, and from 1982 to 
2017. This embraces both the 35-year period following the Federal Circuit’s 
 
* Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. Many thanks, for helpful feedback, to Greg Reilly and 
Tim Holbrook. ã Joseph Scott Miller. 
 1.  See generally Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Chamber, REUTERS INVESTIGATES (Dec. 8, 2014, 
10:30 AM GMT) (reporting results of an empirical study of private-lawyer success rates in petitioning 
for U.S. Supreme Court review from 2004 to 2012), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-re-
port/scotus/. According to WilmerHale’s web site, Mr. Waxman, a partner there, has argued 75 cases at 
the Supreme Court to date. https://www.wilmerhale.com/seth_waxman/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).  
 2.  Seth P. Waxman, May You Live In Interesting Times: Patent Law in the Supreme Court, 17 
CHI.-KENT J. OF INTELL. PROP. 214, 214 (2017).  
 3.  Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr, Les Guêpes [The Wasps], Jan. 1849. Scanned copies of the work 
are readily available at https://archive.org. In the 1862 printing of Series 6, the epigram appears at the end 
of the first full paragraph on page 305, https://archive.org/details/lesgupes06karruoft. Cf. Mark A Lemley, 
The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (“Despite the undeniable 
significance of these changes . . . something curious has happened to the fundamental characteristics of 
the patent ecosystem during this period [from the 1990s to 2015]: very little. Whether we look at the 
number of patent applications filed, the number of patents issued, the number of lawsuits filed, the pa-
tentee win rate in those lawsuits, or the market for patent licenses, the data show very little evidence that 
patent owners and challengers are behaving differently because of changes in the law. The patent system, 
in other words, seems surprisingly resilient to changes in the law.”). 
 4.  See generally Joseph Scott Miller, Which Supreme Court Cases Influenced Recent Supreme 
Court IP Decisions? A Citation Study, 21 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 10–15, 29–43 (2017) (describing and 
applying these network-analysis metrics and data-visualization tools to a smaller citation study of U.S. 
Supreme Court opinions in intellectual property law cases decided from October 1994 to June 2017).  
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creation in 19825—the focus of Waxman’s reflections6—and the 35-year pe-
riod leading to that 1982 turning point. 
1. There are two points on which Waxman and I entirely agree. First, 
he notes the “uptick” in the Supreme Court’s patent-case rate, during a time 
when the overall number of the Court’s merits cases has declined.7 Waxman 
compares the 17 patent cases decided from 1983 to 2006, or about 0.7 cases 
per year, to the 33 cases decided from 2006 to 2017, or 3 cases per year. One 
can also consider the rolling five-year average of patent cases per Supreme 
Court term, to gauge change annually. By my count, the rolling five-year 
average of Supreme Court patent cases is, after the October 2016 Term, at 4 
per Term8—a level not seen since the 1940s.9 Copyright and trademark 
cases, by contrast, are at a rolling five-year average of 2 cases per Term com-
bined, suggesting that there is not simply an increased interest in, or recog-
nition of the importance of, all intellectual property cases equally.10 Since 
the October 2005 Term, patent cases dominate the Court’s IP docket to a 
notable degree. 
Second, as Waxman observes, “[o]verwhelmingly, what matters to the 
Court are its own cases and the express statutory text.”11 Multiple citation 
studies show that supreme courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, gener-
ally cite their own cases more often than those of any other court.12 That 
pattern holds in the Court’s intellectual property cases from 1994 to 2017.13 
“Any court with a significant stock of its own opinions shows a marked pref-
erence for citing them.”14 
Perhaps he and I also agree that the greater number of recent Supreme 
Court patent-law decisions is neither all boon nor all bane. Waxman does, 
however, urge the Court to slow its patent-law roll: “I hope that, going for-
ward, the Court will take stock of the substantial changes it has already 
 
 5.  Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 37 (1982); see gen-
erally Harold C. Petrowitz, Federal Court Reform: The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982-And 
Beyond, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 543, 553–57 (1983) (describing the then-new Federal Circuit’s creation). 
 6.  Waxman, supra note 2, at 215 & n.8. 
 7.  Id. at 215–16. 
 8.  Miller, supra note 4, at 3 & fig.1. 
 9.  John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 518, 520–22 & figs.1, 2 (2010) (reporting per-Term patent-case rates from 1810 to 2007). 
 10.  Miller, supra note 4, at 3 & fig.1.  
 11.  Waxman, supra note 2, at 222. 
 12.  Miller, supra note 4, at 6–8 (discussing four such studies). 
 13.  Id. at 19–20 (reporting citation data for such cases). 
 14.  William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative Study, 94 
L. LIB. J. 267, 269 (2002). Manz reports, for example, that “almost 70% of the cases cited in the Court’s 
majority opinions during the 1996 Term were Supreme Court decisions.” Id. at 269–70 & tbl.3. 
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wrought and their effect as it considers further adjustments.”15 He grounds 
the recommendation in concerns about the greater pace of change (“the pace 
of change has been so rapid that no one knows the full effect of the Court’s 
decisions”16), as well as the direction of change (“general impressions that 
something is not right in the state of patent law seem to have contributed 
over time to a greater willingness to second-guess the Federal Circuit”17) and 
the character of change (“reflect[ing] the age-old debate about rules and 
standards,” the “Federal Circuit has traditionally been more inclined to adopt 
rules,” whereas the “Supreme Court, by contrast, has a high tolerance for 
uncertainty”18). 
My view of the desirability of continued Supreme Court review of mul-
tiple patent cases per Term is much closer to that of Federal Circuit Judge 
Dyk: “Supreme Court review of [Federal Circuit patent] cases is both essen-
tial and highly beneficial.”19 That review cannot help but change patent doc-
trine, to be sure.20 But some of the change simply returned patent law to the 
course that the Supreme Court had already set, and that the Federal Circuit 
had failed to heed. For example, in TC Heartland, a unanimous Supreme 
Court restored the patent venue statute’s “resides” clause to the construction 
the Court had given it six decades earlier.21 In KSR, a unanimous Court re-
stored to the nonobviousness inquiry the “expansive and flexible approach” 
 
 15.  Waxman, supra note 2, at 219–220 (“One solution would be for the Court to pause for a time 
and let the changes it has already made sink in.”). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 219. 
 18.  Id. at 221. The ‘Federal Circuit rules v. Supreme Court standards’ contrast can be overdrawn. 
The Court does sometimes prefer standards to rules, as Waxman describes. Id. at 220–21. But sometimes 
the Court prefers a rule to a standard, as in the “on-sale bar” context. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 
55, 65–66 & n.11 (1998) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “totality of the circumstances” test in favor of a 
two-step “ready for patenting” test). More importantly, many of the Court’s recent patent cases are not 
fought on the ‘rules v. standards’ field at all, involving issues such as: the scope of Seventh Amendment 
jury rights, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); interactions between the Patent 
Act and other federal statutes, e.g., Caraco Pharma. Labs. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012); 
the scope of federal jurisdiction, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013); burdens of proof, e.g., 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014); the scope of judicial review 
of agency action, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1990); the scope of indirect infringement liabil-
ity, e.g., Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015); and the presumption against extrater-
ritorial effect for federal statutes, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007). 
 19.  Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship Between the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 67, 83–84 (2016). 
 20.  See id. at 72–77 (discussing some of these changes). 
 21.  TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1516–17 (2017) (“In 
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 226 (1957), this Court concluded that for 
purposes of [28 U.S.C.] § 1400(b) a domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation. . . . 
We conclude that the amendments to [28 U.S.C.] § 1391 did not modify the meaning of § 1400(b) as 
interpreted by Fourco. We therefore hold that a domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of incor-
poration for purposes of the patent venue statute.”). 
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the Court had prescribed four decades earlier in Graham.22 In Festo, a unan-
imous Court restored the prosecution-history-estoppel inquiry to a calibra-
tion method the Court had endorsed six decades earlier in Exhibit Supply and 
refined just five years before in Warner-Jenkinson.23 These are doctrinal 
changes of a kind, but they also reflect a deeper continuity in the structural 
relationship between the Supreme Court and the subordinate federal courts 
in the construction and application of federal law. And even in a case that 
turns on a patent-law question that the Court has not previously considered—
such as the laches question at the heart of SCA Hygiene,24 as Waxman de-
scribes—the structural principle should inform parties’ expectations about 
the contours of patent doctrine. Until the Supreme Court settles a patent law 
question, that question is not fully settled, as the Supreme Court itself stated 
plainly in 1888.25 Professor Robin Feldman’s assessment of the October 
2013 Term’s patent cases rings true, to me, more broadly: “[A] strong mes-
sage echoes through the six Supreme Court decisions. It is a message about 
restraint, about carefully constructed logic, and about coming into the fold 
of judicial decision-making.”26 
Patent law is still law—exclusively federal law, at that. The Supreme 
Court oversees a complex set of interactions among legislative settlements 
of general policy directives,27 executive administration under these 
 
 22.  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007) (“We begin by rejecting the rigid 
approach of the Court of Appeals. Throughout this Court’s engagement with the question of obviousness, 
our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals 
applied its TSM test here. . . . [T]he principles laid down in Graham [v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 
(1966)] reaffirmed the ‘functional approach’ of Hotchkiss [v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851)]. 
To this end, Graham set forth a broad inquiry and invited courts, where appropriate, to look at any sec-
ondary considerations that would prove instructive.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 23.  Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737–41 (2002) (discuss-
ing Warner–Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997), and Exhibit Supply Co. v. 
Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942)). 
 24.  SCA Hygiene v. First Quality Baby Prods., 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017). 
 25.  See Andrews v. Hovey, 124 U.S. 694, 716–17 (1888) (“A question arising in regard to the 
construction of a statute of the United States concerning patents for inventions cannot be regarded as 
judicially settled when it has not been so settled by the highest judicial authority which can pass upon the 
question. . . . No question arising in any such case, reviewable by this court, can be regarded as finally 
settled, so as to establish the law for like cases, until it has been determined by this court.”).  
 26.  Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAG 2d 27, 27–28 (2014). 
 27.  The Patent Act’s text is quite open textured, more like the Sherman Act than the Internal Rev-
enue Code. See John F. Duffy, KSR v. Teleflex: Predictable Reform of Patent Substance and Procedure 
in the Judiciary, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 34, 37 (2007) (“Although patent law is a creature 
of federal statute, it has long been dominated by judicially-created common law. As in antitrust (that 
‘other’ branch of federal monopoly law), the key statutory provisions fairly exude ambiguity.”); see also 
Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 53 (2010) (same). 
This is another point on which Waxman and I agree. See Waxman, supra note 2, at 222–23 (noting that 
“the Patent Act is notably not a comprehensive statement of patent law,” and that “[m]any patent doc-
trines, arising from tort and equity, are not included in the text at all”).   
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directives (albeit through a federal agency that is, compared to most, weak28), 
and judicial dispute resolution within that matrix of legislative and adminis-
trative material. The Court is playing its familiar role as the highest judicial 
tribunal responsible for the reasoned elaboration of federal law, including 
the federal law of judiciary-agency relations. It is supervising not only patent 
law, but also patent law, particularly the patent system’s public infrastruc-
ture. From this perspective, it is critically important that the Court’s regular 
review of patent cases should continue at a pace the Court itself thinks ade-
quate. 
The Court’s sense of its structural role may also help explain another 
facet of its increased engagement with patent law—namely, the higher una-
nimity rate in these cases, together with the trademark and copyright cases. 
Waxman notes the high degree of agreement in the Court’s 2016–17 patent 
cases,29 but the phenomenon is more widespread than that. Consider the 
Court’s 73 patent, trademark, and copyright cases from the October 1994 
Term30 through the October 2016 Term, inclusive. (A list of the cases, with 
the vote split in each, is set forth in the Appendix to this paper.) Patent cases 
dominate the group, with 47; trademark (14) and copyright (12) together 
comprise 26. Across these cases, the Court shows a remarkable level of in-
ternal agreement. Among the patent cases, 31 of 47 (66%) drew no dissent. 
Among all the IP cases together, 47 of 73 (64%) drew no dissent. For com-
parison, the unanimity rate across all the Court’s merits cases, in recent dec-
ades, hovers at about 40%.31 Waxman “find[s] it puzzling and somewhat 
 
 28.  “Unlike the sweeping delegations [to agencies] conferred in the Progressive and New Deal eras, 
the delegations of governmental power for the patent system were, and still are, extraordinarily narrow.” 
John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Tech-
nology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1133 (2000). The PTO may be stronger, at least in some 
discrete areas, due to broader rulemaking authority conferred by the 2011 America Invents Act. See 
Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142–46 (2016) (using Chevron deference, a familiar 
feature of judicial review of agency substantive rules, to affirm a PTO rule for construing patent scope 
during inter partes review of an issued patent under the America Invents Act); see also John M. Golden, 
Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657, 1671–91 (2016) (discussing 
judicial review of agency action in the PTO context, including changes occasioned by the America In-
vents Act); Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609 (2012) (same). 
 29.  Waxman, supra note 2, at 222. 
 30.  The October 1994 Term marks an inflection point in the Supreme Court’s appetite for patent 
cases: “the 1994 Term was the beginning of a long-term trend. While the Court had decided only five 
patent cases in the first dozen Terms in which the Federal Circuit was in existence, its next five patent 
cases were decided in the four Terms after 1994 (1995–1998, inclusive). . . . In its next ten Terms (1999–
2008, inclusive), the Justices would hear argument and issue opinions in eleven more Federal Circuit 
patent cases. Thus, unlike its anemic average . . . during the 1983–1994 Terms, the Court in the years 
since 1994 has averaged more than one patent case per Term . . . .” Duffy, supra note 9, at 523–24 (foot-
notes omitted). 
 31.  LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 125–26 & fig.3.1 (upper right panel, labeled “Unanimous Maximum”). Put 
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troubling” that the votes in the patent cases seem “lopsided,” worrying that, 
without the disciplining “internal check” of a “robust dissent,” any “soft 
spots in the majority’s reasoning are less likely to be rectified”—and ex-
pressing the related fear that the resulting opinions are, in effect, too short.32 
This may be cause for concern. At the same time, the more common criticism 
of the Court is that its opinions have become too long, complex, and frac-
tured: “Many commentators contend Supreme Court opinions are exces-
sively long and argue longer opinions result in a variety of negative conse-
quences.”33 Among them is the risk of greater confusion in the lower courts, 
which itself may widen lower-court judges’ discretion in how they imple-
ment those Supreme Court decisions in subsequent cases.34 As reporter 
Adam Liptak pointedly observed in 2010, at a time when the Court “often 
provides only limited or ambiguous guidance to lower courts” and “increas-
ingly does so at enormous length,” it is well to remember that “Brown v. 
Board of Education . . . managed to do its work in fewer than 4,000 words.”35 
2. On the terrain Waxman deftly describes, we have common ground. 
The Court is hearing more patent cases, focusing most on its own precedents 
when it does so, and deciding them with greater unanimity than is typical of 
the Court’s recent output. We also have some differences, where Waxman 
sees both more change, and more rapid change, than do I. In what remains, 
my goal is to shift the terrain, looking at the Court’s IP cases over a longer 
time span, from 1947 to 2017, and from a citations-analysis perspective. My 
examination of the Court’s citations to its own cases in this period persuades 
me that the recent changes in patent doctrine occur within a larger matrix of 
stability and continuity. In a snapshot of any short period, because the Court 
is deciding a cohort of discrete legal questions that may differ from the ques-
tions in some other short period, the pattern of cited precedents may seem to 
vary sharply. Viewed over a longer time period, however, the Court’s cita-
tions show that it weaves each new case into the dense tapestry of existing 
 
differently, since about 1950, about 60% of all the Court’s cases contain at least one dissent. Id. at 68 & 
fig.2.1. 
 32.  Waxman, supra note 2, at 222 (“Altogether, the Court’s opinions in the four patent cases I 
argued last Term fill only 29 pages of the Supreme Court Reports, and the vast majority of those pages 
simply recited the relevant facts and legal principles.”). 
 33.  Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme Court 
Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 627 (2008) (reporting a comprehensive empirical study of the length of 
Supreme Court opinions and how it has changed over time). 
 34.  Id. at 628 (describing this risk). 
 35.  Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court: Justices Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 18, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html. The opinion 
in Brown, excluding the syllabus and lawyers’ names, occupies 11 pages in the official reporter. See 
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486–96 (1954). 
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decisional law. The tapestry endures, even as it changes gradually in the em-
brace of new threads. 
By way of background, it is simple enough to think of a set of judicial 
decisions and the citations linking them to one another as a network, with the 
cases as nodes in the network and the citations as edges connecting them.36 
Quantitative study of large case-law citation networks, however, is still quite 
new. Indeed, “until recently, large-scale analysis of citation practices were 
impractical; data was difficulty to acquire, analysis methods were rudimen-
tary, and computational power was insufficient.”37 Happily, “[i]n the last 
decade, all three of the barriers to large-scale empirical citation analysis have 
been greatly reduced.”38 I have performed a citation-network analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s IP cases from 1994 to 2017 and draw on that work here.39 
Two network-analysis studies of U.S. Supreme Court opinions, both led 
by political scientist Professor James Fowler,40 provide the foundation for 
the network analyses I present below. A critical feature of network analysis 
is that it allows one to differentiate nodes by their relative importance to—
their centrality41 in—the network. For example, both Fowler studies proceed 
from the premise that “[a] citation analysis is an ideal way to tap ‘case im-
portance’ . . . define[d] as the legal relevance of a case for the network of law 
at the Supreme Court.”42 Because we can treat “a citation to a precedent as a 
latent judgment by a judge regarding the relevance of the case for helping to 
resolve a legal dispute,” it is “reasonable to determine how relevant a partic-
ular opinion is by considering how,” in granular detail, “it is embedded in 
the broader network of opinions comprising the law.”43 The Fowler studies 
 
 36.  See Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309, 316–17 (2007) (“A net-
work is just a set of items, termed nodes or vertices, with connections among them, termed links or edges. 
Networks are mathematical objects, but there are concrete examples everywhere. . . . The Web of Law is 
the network that consists of cases and other legal authorities, such as statutes, treatises, and law review 
articles (the nodes), and the citations that link them to one another.”) (emphases in original) (footnote 
omitted). 
 37.  Ryan Whalen et al., Common Law Evolution and Judicial Impact in the Age of Information, 9 
ELON L. REV. 115, 120 (2017). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  See Miller, supra note 4, at 10–15 (reviewing the key concepts and tools for conducting network 
analysis of case-law citation networks); see also Ryan Whalen, Legal Networks: The Promises and Chal-
lenges of Legal Network Analysis, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 539, 547–50 (reviewing legal citation network 
studies). 
 40.  See James H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 SOC. 
NETWORKS 16 (2008); see also James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the 
Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324 (2007). 
 41.  “A large volume of research on networks has been devoted to the concept of centrality. This 
research addresses the question, ‘Which are the most important or central vertices in a network?’” M.E.J. 
NEWMAN, NETWORKS: AN INTRODUCTION 168 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010). 
 42.  Fowler et al., supra note 40, at 325. 
 43.  Id. at 326. 
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use mathematical tools developed to analyze social networks to map the case 
citation network “among all majority opinions released by the U.S. Supreme 
Court between 1791 and 2005.”44 
“There are of course many possible definitions of importance, and cor-
respondingly many centrality measures for networks.”45 One way to quantify 
centrality, for each case/node in the network, is with a count of the links the 
case possesses. “The total number of links leading to and from each node is 
the ‘degree,’ where the in degree is the total number of inward citations and 
the out degree is the total number of outward citations.”46 It is “[p]erhaps the 
simplest centrality measure in a network,” and doubtless “it can be very illu-
minating.”47 For example, in a body of scholarly literature, “[t]he number of 
citations a paper receives from other papers, which is simply its in-degree in 
the citation network, gives a crude measure of whether the paper has been 
influential or not and is widely used as a metric for judging the impact of 
scientific research.”48 And just so with a citation network that transits a set 
of judicial opinions: “At the most basic level one might use the number of 
inward citations, or degree centrality, to measure the importance of a given 
decision.”49 
 
As the Fowler studies discuss, however, degree centrality is 
a second best, precisely because it treats every citing case’s 
citation to a target case as having the same weight as every 
other—even though the very citation network under exami-
nation can provide information that negates the premise. As 
Fowler and Jeon explain, this measure does not fully use in-
formation in the precedent network because it treats all in-
ward citations in exactly the same way. Ideally, we should 
be able to use information we obtain about the importance 
of cited cases to improve our estimate of the importance of 
the cases that they cite. For example, suppose decision i is 
 
 44.  Id. at 327. The second of the studies uses a larger set of cases, but the addition of these cases 
from the mid-1700s contributes only minimally to the resulting citation network. Fowler & Jeon, supra 
note 40, at 18 & n.2. 
 45.  NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 168–69; see also Iain Carmichael et al., Comment, Examining the 
Evolution of Legal Precedent Through Citation Network Analysis, 96 N.C. L. REV. 227, 230 (2017) 
(“There are many different ways to quantify the importance of a vertex in a network, called vertex cen-
trality metrics.”). 
 46.  Fowler et al., supra note 40, at 328. 
 47.  NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 169; see also Carmichael et al., supra note 45, at 230 (“Two of the 
simplest vertex centrality metrics are in-degree and out-degree.”). 
 48.  NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 169. 
 49.  Fowler & Jeon, supra note 40, at 20. 
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cited by a case that is considered to be very important and 
decision j is cited by a case that is not. This suggests that 
decision i may itself be more important than decision j.50 
 
To illustrate this shortcoming of degree centrality using the network of 
Supreme Court IP cases that I analyze in detail below, consider Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,51 a case involving a “human cannonball” 
performer’s right-of-publicity claim against a broadcast television station. 
To date, the Supreme Court has cited Zacchini in two subsequent IP cases—
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises52 (a copyright fair use 
case), and San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic 
Committee53 (a congressionally-mandated-trademark case). In this network, 
Zacchini has a degree centrality score of two, with Harper & Row and SFAA 
each contributing one point. To date, however, the Supreme Court has cited 
Harper & Row in eight subsequent IP cases,54 but cited SFAA in only two 
subsequent IP cases.55 The degree centrality metric makes no use of that in-
formation, even though the greater weight of Harper & Row, compared to 
SFAA, is evident in the very citation network they share with Zacchini. 
There is need, then, of a centrality metric that does value inward cita-
tions according to the centrality of the cases from which they originate. There 
is more than one available.56 The Fowler studies test the utility, for judicial 
case-citation networks, of a centrality metric that information scientist Pro-
fessor Jon Kleinberg developed to organize web pages for topical searches.57 
The metric, now known in the network-analysis literature as “hubs and 
 
 50.  Id. at 20. 
 51.  433 U.S. 562 (1977). The federal question in Zacchini was whether the broadcaster’s free press 
rights to publish news about the performance immunized it against the performer’s right-of-publicity 
claim. Id. at 565–66. The Court’s answer, in brief, was “no.” 
 52.  471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985). 
 53.  483 U.S. 522, 533 (1987). 
 54.  See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 326 (2012); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 
(2002); New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495 n.3 (2001); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); 
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 223 (1990); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olym-
pic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 541 n.19 (1987); Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216–17 (1985). 
 55.  See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752 (2017); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.  
 56.  See NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 169–81 (describing eigenvector, Katz, PageRank, and hubs & 
authorities centrality measures); see also Carmichael et al., supra note 45, at 237–38 (discussing the “class 
of eigenvector centrality metrics,” which “judge a case to be more important if it is cited by many cases 
that are themselves cited by many other cases” and include “PageRank, Eigenvector centrality, and hubs 
and authorities”) (footnotes omitted). 
 57.  See Jon M. Kleinberg, Authoritative Sources in a Hyperlinked Environment, 46 J. ASSOC. FOR 
COMPUTING MACHINERY 604, 605 (1999) (“In particular, we focus on the use of links for analyzing the 
collection of pages relevant to a broad search topic, and for discovering the most ‘authoritative’ pages on 
such topics.”).  
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authorities,” is the output of “a centrality algorithm called hyperlink-induced 
topic search or HITS.”58 
Fowler and Jeon explain the Kleinberg algorithm’s capacity “to draw 
on both inward and outward citations for assessing importance,”59 in a man-
ner that is readily accessible even to one who cannot write an implementing 
algorithm. Specifically: 
 
A hub is a case that cites many other decisions, helping to 
define which legally relevant decisions are pertinent to a 
given precedent, while an authority is a case that is widely 
cited by other decisions. Most cases act as both hubs and 
authorities, and the degree to which cases fulfill these roles 
is mutually reinforcing within the precedent network. A case 
that is a good hub cites many good authorities, and a case 
that is a good authority is cited by many good hubs. . . . The 
resulting [numerical] hub and authority scores allow us to 
identify the key precedents in the network—precedents that 
are influential (authorities) and precedents that are well 
founded in law (hubs).60 
 
Using the authority or hub scores computed for each node in a case-
citation network, then, one can rank order the included cases by im-
portance.61 Fowler and Jeon, to test the validity of authority score as a cen-
trality metric, used the subject-matter categories tracked in the Spaeth Su-
preme Court Database62 to identify the top five cases by authority score, from 
1953 to 2000, in four topical areas.63 Those same cases are highlighted for 
importance in expert-opinion-based guides: Congressional Quarterly’s 1997 
Guide to the United States Supreme Court, the 1999 Oxford Guide to Su-
preme Court Decisions, and the 2005 Legal Information Institute list.64 In 
 
 58.  NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 178–79. 
 59.  Fowler & Jeon, supra note 40, at 20.  
 60.  Id. (emphasis in original); accord Kleinberg, supra note 57, at 611 (“Hubs and authorities ex-
hibit what could be called a mutually reinforcing relationship: a good hub is a page that points to many 
good authorities; a good authority is a page that is pointed to by many good hubs.”) (emphasis in original). 
 61.  Widely available software for conducting network analysis and creating data visualizations, 
such as the open-source application Gephi, https://gephi.org/, computes authority and hub scores as a 
matter of routine. I used Gephi to compute the authority scores and create the visualizations presented 
below. 
 62.  The Spaeth data set has provided the basis for a wealth of political science research on Supreme 
Court decision making. For a rich exploration of the core findings in the field, the interested reader should 
see Epstein et al., supra note 31, at chs. 2–3, 6. 
 63.  Fowler & Jeon, supra note 40, at 23 tbl.3.  
 64.  Id. at 20 (describing these sources), 23 tbl.3 note. 
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addition, annualized graphs of individual case’s authority scores do a stun-
ningly effective job charting the way that overruling precedents rise up and 
displace the authority of the cases they overrule,65 and the way that a case’s 
importance can rise and fall as the issue-set of interest to the Court shifts 
over time.66 The Kleinberg authority score serves, in 
short, as a valid measure of a case’s importance within a 
citation network of judicial opinions. 
A streamlined example with a hypothetical set of 
case citations helps illustrate the authority score as a net-
work centrality metric. The earliest case in the line is A. 
Subsequent cases B, C, D, and E each cite to A. E also 
cites to B, as do cases F, G, and H. All told, the cases 
run from A to O; one can list those that cite outward to 
earlier cases in a column labeled “Source,” and those 
that receive cites inward from later cases in a column 
labeled “Target.” In the network analysis literature, this 
is known as an edge list.67 Figure 1 fully states the edge 
list for this simple case citation network. 
Using network analysis and graphing software, 
such as Gephi,68 one can also visualize the nodes and 
edges of this network in varied of ways.69 A common 
form of visualization uses a mapping algorithm to spread 
out nodes and edges in a readable way. The algorithm I 
used to create the visualizations presented here—
ForceAtlas2—provides “a force directed layout: it simulates a physical sys-
tem in order to spatialize a network. Nodes repulse each other like charged 
particles, while edges attract their nodes, like springs. The forces create a 
movement that converges to a balanced state.”70 The network graph depicts 
that balanced state. To better understand the clustering of nodes within the 
network, one can also apply a separate algorithm for “community detection,” 
i.e., “divid[ing] the vertices” or nodes “so that the groups formed are tightly 
 
 65.  Id. at 25–26, 26 fig.7. 
 66.  Id. at 26–27, 27 figs.8 & 9; see also id. at 28 (“[A]uthority scores conform to qualitative assess-
ments about which issues and cases the Court prioritizes and how these change over time”). 
 67.  See NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 300–01. 
 68.  See Gephi, supra note 61. 
 69.  See NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 8 (“Visualization can be an extraordinarily useful tool in the 
analysis of network data, allowing one to see instantly important structural features of a network that 
would otherwise be difficult to pick out of the raw data.”). 
 70.  Mathieu Jacomy et al., ForceAtlas2, a Continuous Graph Layout Algorithm for Handy Network 
Visualization Designed for the Gephi Software, 9(6) PLOS ONE 2 (2014).  
Figure 1: Illustrative 
Edge List for a Cita-
tion Network 
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knit with many edges inside [the] 
groups and only a few edges be-
tween groups.”71 Gephi provides 
both a community detection algo-
rithm and a convenient means for 
assigning a common color to the 
nodes and edges in a given case 
cluster. Applying this algorithm, 
known as Modularity, to the nodes 
in a ForceAtlas2 map of the cita-
tions in Figure 1 produces a graph 
with three clusters. The map is in 
Figure 2. All the nodes, and their 
labels, are the same size. 
What of the authority-score data? Before looking at the scores Gephi 
computes for this network, 
consider the matter intuitively. 
Cases A, C, and D each have an 
in-degree of 5, compared to 
Case B’s in-degree of 4; their 
authority scores should be 
higher than B’s. Cases E 
through O each have an in-de-
gree of 0; their authority scores 
should be 0. Case O has an out-
degree of 4, so its hub score 
should be high. Case A cites 
nothing, so its hub score should 
be 0. Finally, Case C is cited by 
both Cases O (likely to have a 
high hub score) and K (itself 
cited by O, boosting its central-
ity), suggesting it may have the 
highest authority score. These 
surmises are borne out by the 
authority and hub scores for the 
 
 71.  NEWMAN, supra note 41, at 354; see also id. at 378 (observing that “‘communities’ are defined 
to be the natural groupings of vertices in networks,” and that “we would like to be able to find them 
whatever their number”). 
Node Authority Score Hub Score 
C 0.5998 0.1635 
D 0.5549 0.1635 
A 0.4741 0 
B 0.2434 0.1635 
K 0.2197 0.3981 
O 0 0.6373 
H 0 0.2907 
E 0 0.2474 
I 0 0.2068 
J 0 0.2068 
L 0 0.1913 
M 0 0.1913 
N 0 0.1913 
F 0 0.0839 
G 0 0.0839 
Figure 2 
Table 1: Authority and Hub Scores for Network 
in Figure 1. 
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network, which are listed in Table 
1 in descending order of authority 
score, then hub score. 
We can also modify the net-
work map to depict the authority 
scores. Gephi permits one to vary 
node and text size according to a 
metric associated with the nodes. 
Thus, I can change the map so that 
both node size and node label vary 
in direct proportion to a node’s au-
thority score. Important nodes 
stand out more. The revised map is 
in Figure 3. (One could, alterna-
tively, create a map with nodes that vary with hub score.) 
With this illustration as a backdrop, it is time to put the Supreme Court’s 
recent IP decisions in the context of a longer time span. The root data here 
are citations from Supreme Court IP cases decided after argument, to other 
Supreme Court cases of any doctrinal type. The overall set has source cases 
decided between 1947 and 2017, inclusive.72 There are also two subsets cov-
ering 35 years, 1947 to 1981 and 1982 to 2017. One can generate, for each 
of these three edge lists, a rank-ordered list of cases/nodes by authority score, 
as well as a map to visualize the network. Comparing these three views, one 
can see how much the 1982–2017 citation network changed the 1947–1981 
citation network to yield the 1947–2017 citation network. 
In gathering the citation data, I defined the category “IP cases” broadly. 
It includes not only cases decided under the Patent Act, Copyright Act, and 
Lanham Act, but also cases that turn in a material way on the scope of IP 
rights—cases such FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,73 an antitrust case about whether a 
type of patent-litigation-settlement agreement can trigger Sherman Act lia-
bility; and Zacchini, the right-of-publicity case discussed earlier.74 I identi-
fied the cases using computer searches (in the Westlaw database) of the 
Court’s decisions during the relevant time period, with search terms such as 
 
 72.  The full edge list, for the 1947–2017 cases, is available as an Excel file on this Journal’s Schol-
arly Commons website. The URL is https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/vol17/iss2/1/. 
 73.  570 U.S. 136 (2013). 
 74.  See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. The right of publicity is conventionally under-
stood to be an intellectual-property right. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 28:8 (5th ed.) (“The law of the right of publicity bears some resemblance to the law of 
trademarks and service marks. Both areas are ‘intellectual property’ and are properly placed within that 
family of laws dubbed ‘unfair competition.’”) (footnote omitted).  
Figure 3 
   
390 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 17:2 
“Patent Act,” “Copyright Act,” “Lanham Act,” and “(licens! or infring! or 
valid! or invalid!) /s (patent or copyright or trademark).” I also relied on my 
familiarity with the cases from teaching them in IP courses or antitrust 
courses (which I have done continuously, in one form or fashion, since 
2001), as well as lists of Supreme Court IP cases maintained by others that 
are readily available through internet search. 
I compiled the list of citations to target cases from the source IP cases 
by reading the opinion(s) in the case and recording each Supreme Court case 
cited one or more times therein. A case cited five times gets one entry on the 
edge list, just as a case cited once does; put differently, the study does not 
measure citation intensity within source cases. Importantly, for each source 
IP case, I included in its list of target citations all the cited cases, no matter 
where those cited cases first appeared—in a majority opinion, a concurrence, 
or a dissent. All the opinions in a case, together, embody the full Supreme 
Court’s encounter with a case and present the full Court’s stated explanation 
for its disposition of the case. Each citation is the authoring justice’s freely 
chosen indication that the cited case is an influence in what that justice views 
as the proper publicly stated ground for the prudent disposition of the case.75 
That citing act, publicly stated, makes the citation linkage a thread in the 
fabric of the law. For the same reason, I included all the relevant target cita-
tions without respect to the stated reason, if any, for the citation, or the degree 
to which the source case expressly analyzed or distinguished the target 
case.76 
In the citation network compiled from Supreme Court IP cases from 
1947 to 2017, there are 1,610 nodes and 2,867 edges. Of those case nodes, 
181 have an out degree of 1 or more, i.e., are source cases. The network 
compiled from the 1947–1981 subset has 658 nodes and 1,204 edges, with 
81 source cases (i.e., cases with an out degree of 1 or more). The network 
compiled from the 1982–2017 subset has 1,145 nodes and 1,663 edges, with 
100 source cases. 
Beginning with the 1982–2017 network, which includes the present pe-
riod of increased Supreme Court attention to patent law, the median authority 
 
 75.  See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law, 2 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 381, 386 (2000) (“It can signify an acknowledgment of priority or influence, a useful source 
of information, a focus of disagreement, an acknowledgment of controlling authority, or the prestige of 
the cited work or its author. All of these are forms of influence, in a broad sense, and that may be enough 
to justify lumping them together for purposes of citations studies concerned with measuring influence.”). 
 76.  See William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of 
Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 273 (1998) (“We have not distinguished between favorable, 
critical, or distinguishing citations. It is not clear that we should. Critical citations . . . are also a gauge of 
influence since it is easier to ignore an unimportant decision than to spell out reasons for not following 
it.”). 
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score among all 1,145 case nodes in this subset is 0.0056. The top 30 author-
ity scores range from 0.2535 to 0.0928. Those top 30 cases and their author-
ity scores are provided in Table 2. Most are IP cases, and 12 were decided in 
1980 or later. 
In the 1947–1981 network, the median authority score among all 658 
case nodes is 0.0042. The top 30 authority scores range from 0.2736 to 
0.0907. Those top 30 cases and their authority scores are provided in Table 
3. Many are antitrust cases, and none were decided after 1950 (though 19 
were decided in the 1940s). This is, in other words, quite a different top-30-
authorities list from that of the 1982–2017 network. Indeed, there are only 
two cases common to both lists: Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal 
Film Mfg. Co.,77 ranked #15 in the 1982–2017 network and #11 in the 1947–
1981 network; and United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,78 ranked #22 
in the 1982–2017 network and #27 in the 1947–1981 network. 
We can see this difference in visualization maps of these two networks. 
I generated maps for each network and, using the community detection al-
gorithm, applied a common color palette to both (in descending order of 
community size, measured in number of constituent nodes). I filtered the 
nodes to remove all but the top 100 nodes by authority score, then applied 
the force-mapping algorithm to that top-100 group (setting node and label 
size to vary directly with authority score). The top-100 map for the 1982–
2017 network (containing 102, or 8.9%, of 1,145 nodes) is in Figure 4, and 
the top-100 map for the 1947–1981 network (containing 100, or 15.2%, of 
658 nodes) is in Figure 5. They bear little resemblance to one another. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 77.  243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
 78.  334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
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Table 2: Top 30 Cases in the 1982–2017 Network, in Descending Order by Authority Score 
 
† Eisner has been made famous by Justice Holmes’ quip, in this challenge to the constitutionality of a 
federal estate tax, that on some points of law “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” 256 U.S. 
345, 349 (1921). As of February 2018, the query “(‘page of history’ /s ‘volume of logic) /p Eisner” in 
Westlaw’s SCT database yields 17 cases spanning seven decades. 
Case Node Authority Score 
Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats (1989) 0.2535 
Graham v. John Deere Co. (1966) 0.2027 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984) 0.1918 
Twentieth Century Music v. Aiken (1975) 0.1792 
Grant v. Raymond (1832) 0.1651 
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs. (1998) 0.1646 
Kewanee Oil v. Bicron (1974) 0.1634 
Mazer v. Stein (1954) 0.1619 
Harper & Row, Publ’rs v. Nation Enters. (1985) 0.1517 
The Trade-Mark Cases (1879) 0.1461 
Fox Film v. Doyal (1932) 0.1460 
Pennock v. Dialogue (1829) 0.1365 
Wheaton v. Peters (1834) 0.1281 
J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l (2001) 0.1267 
Motion Picture Patents v. Universal Film Mfg. (1917) 0.1256 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel (1964) 0.1227 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony (1884) 0.1213 
Marbury v. Madison (1803) 0.1199 
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co. (1938) 0.1193 
New York Trust Co. v. Eisner† (1921) 0.1186 
Brenner v. Manson (1966) 0.1136 
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. (1948) 0.1097 
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. (1991) 0.1075 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (1996) 0.1027 
City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) 0.0962 
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (1989) 0.0959 
Stewart v. Abend (1990) 0.0957 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) 0.0955 
McClurg v. Kingsland (1843) 0.0928 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (1994) 0.0928 
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Table 3: Top 30 Cases in the 1947–1981 Network, in Descending Order by Authority Score 
 
 
 
Case Node Authority Score 
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. (1944) 0.2736 
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States (1940) 0.2350 
Int’l Salt Co. v. United States (1947) 0.2199 
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co. (1942) 0.2140 
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co. (1942) 0.2051 
United States v. Masonite Corp. (1942) 0.1872 
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States (1945) 0.1830 
Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. (1947) 0.1813 
Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp. (1931) 0.1798 
United States v. Nat’l Lead Co. (1947) 0.1626 
Motion Picture Patents v. Universal Film Mfg. (1917) 0.1550 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (1940) 0.1472 
United States v. Univis Lens Co. (1942) 0.1416 
MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. (1947) 0.1409 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (1948) 0.1325 
Mercoid v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. (1944) 0.1276 
IBM v. United States (1936) 0.1243 
Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co. (1945) 0.1230 
Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States (1911) 0.1160 
B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis (1942) 0.1131 
United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States (1922) 0.1116 
Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co. 
(1947) 
0.1103 
United States v. General Elec. Co. (1926) 0.1087 
United States v. Line Material Co. (1948) 0.1056 
Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co. (1902) 0.1049 
Kendall v. Winsor (1859) 0.0976 
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. (1948) 0.0973 
Pope v. Gormully (1892) 0.0942 
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co. (1911) 0.0912 
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States (1939) 0.0907 
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Figure 4: Top 100 Cases, by Authority Score, in the 1982–2017 Network 
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Now consider the full 1947–2017 network. The median authority score 
among all 1,610 case nodes is 0.0014. The top 30 authority scores range from 
0.2657 to 0.924. Those top 30 cases and their authority scores are provided 
in Table 4. This list has a large degree of overlap with the top-30 list for the 
1947–1981 network, notwithstanding the addition of all the citation data 
from the 1982–2017. Indeed, there are 26 cases in the top 30 authority scores 
of both the 1947–1981 and 1947–2017 networks, though many are in differ-
ent ordinal positions. The only four cases in the top 30 of the 1947–2017 
network, that do not also appear in the 1947–1981 network’s top 30, are Gra-
ham v. John Deere Co.79 (#23 in Table 4, and #2 in Table 2 (the 1982-2017 
 
 79.  383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
Figure 5: Top 100 Cases, by Authority Score, in the 1947–1981 Network 
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network)); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.80 (#26 in Table 4); Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
v. Stiffel81 (#28 in Table 4, and #16 in Table 2); and Great Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.82 (#30 in Table 4). This great over-
lap cannot be dismissed on the ground that older cases, having been available 
longer, simply garnered more inward citations. If that were the case, the cor-
relation between a case’s authority score and decisional year would be 
strongly negative—higher authority scores would pair to earlier (smaller) 
calendar-year values. That is not true here. The Pearson’s r between author-
ity score and decisional year for the top 50 cases in the 1947–2017 network 
is 0.295. (In the 1947–1981 network, this r is 0.306, and in the 1982–2017 
network this r is -0.043.) 
By like token, the map of the 1947–2017 network’s top 100 authority-
score nodes much more closely resembles the map for the 1947–1981 top 
100 than it does the map for the 1982–2017 top 100. (Again, I applied the 
same color palette to all three maps, in descending order of community size 
measured in number of constituent nodes.) The map for the 1947–2017 net-
work—containing 100, or 6.2%, of 1,1610 nodes—is in Figure 6. The 1982–
2017, in isolation, looks sharply different.83 The citations that join the map 
as the years progress from 1982 to 2017 are woven into an already dense set 
of citations. In the context of a full sweep from 1947 to 2017, current cita-
tions bring gradual change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80.  224 U.S. 1 (1912). 
 81.  376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
 82.  340 U.S. 147 (1950). 
 83.  This disparate appearance is not a quirk of the 1982–2017 map. If one were to take, for example, 
different 20-year segments of citation data, with no overlapping years, the resulting maps would differ. 
Appendix B, infra, provides a pair of maps that, in their contrast to one another, illustrate the point.  
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Table 4: Top 30 Cases in the 1947–2017 Network, in Descending Order by Authority Score  
  
Case Node Authority Score 
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co. (1944) 0.2657 
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co. (1942) 0.2175 
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States (1940) 0.2149 
Int’l Salt Co. v. United States (1947) 0.2072 
Motion Picture Patents v. Universal Film Mfg. (1917) 0.2026 
Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp. (1931) 0.1849 
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co. (1942) 0.1803 
United States v. Masonite Corp. (1942) 0.1784 
Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. (1947) 0.1635 
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States (1945) 0.1574 
United States v. Univis Lens Co. (1942) 0.1500 
United States v. National Lead Co. (1947) 0.1356 
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. (1948) 0.1280 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (1940) 0.1255 
IBM v. United States (1936) 0.1237 
MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. (1947) 0.1216 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (1948) 0.1214 
Mercoid v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. (1944) 0.1155 
Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co. (1945) 0.1142 
Kendall v. Winsor (1859) 0.1110 
United States v. General Elec. Co. (1926) 0.1072 
United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States (1922) 0.1049 
Graham v. John Deere Co. (1966) 0.1036 
Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States (1911) 0.1011 
B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis (1942) 0.1005 
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. (1912) 0.0997 
Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co. 
(1947) 0.0985 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel (1964) 0.0984 
United States v. Line Material Co. (1948) 0.0941 
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp. 
(1950) 0.0924 
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To close, Mr. Waxman is surely right to caution that the Court should 
avoid approaching patent law in a way that “‘disrupt[s] the settled expecta-
tions of the inventing community.’”84 Those expectations, in turn, are a func-
tion of the different perspectives from which observers take stock of the pace 
and scale of change in the Court’s decisions. Put in the larger context of the 
case-law influences that the Court itself inscribes in its patent law and other 
IP decisions, which network analysis allows us systematically to assess, the 
changes of the last 35 years have been neither so fast nor so large as to tear 
a gap in the larger web of IP law. 
 
 84.  Waxman, supra note 2, at 225 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki 
Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002)). 
Figure 6: Top 100 Cases, by Authority Score, in the 1947–2017 Network 
    
2018 CHARTING SUPREME COURT PATENT LAW, NEAR AND FAR 399 
APPENDIX A 
Below is a list of the Supreme Court’s decisions in copyright (C), patent 
(P), and trademark (T) cases from its October 1994 Term through its October 
2016 Term, inclusive. The list states, for each case, the number of votes for 
the majority outcome, as well as any concurrences in or dissents from that 
outcome. Cases are listed in reverse chronological order, by type (C, P, or 
T). 
 
Name Vol Rprtr Page Mjrty Cncr Dssnt Type 
Star Athletica, LLC v. 
Varsity Brands, Inc. 
137 S. Ct. 1002 5 1 2 C 
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. 
136 S. Ct. 1979 8 0 0 C 
ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2498 6 0 3 C 
Petrella v. MGM, Inc.  134 S. Ct. 1962 6 0 3 C 
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. 
568 U.S. 519 6 2 3 C 
Golan v. Holder 565 U.S. 302 6 0 2 C 
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. 
Muchnick 
559 U.S. 154 5 3 0 C 
MGM Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd. 
545 U.S. 913 9 3|3 0 C 
Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186 7 0 2 C 
New York Times Co. v. 
Tasini 
533 U.S. 483 7 0 2 C 
Feltner v. Columbia Pic-
tures Television, Inc. 
523 U.S. 340 8 1 0 C 
Quality King Distribs. v. 
L’Anza Res. Int’l 
523 U.S. 135 9 1 0 C 
Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. 137 S. Ct. 1664 9 1 0 P 
Impression Prods., Inc. v. 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. 
137 S. Ct. 1523 7 1 1 P 
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft 
Foods Group Brands LLC 
137 S. Ct. 1514 8 0 0 P 
SCA Hygiene Prods. v. 
First Quality Baby Prods. 
137 S. Ct. 954 7 0 1 P 
Life Techs. Corp. v. 
Promega Corp. 
137 S. Ct. 734 5 2 0 P 
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Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Ap-
ple Inc. 
137 S. Ct. 429 8 0 0 P 
Cuozzo Speed Techs. v. 
Lee 
136 S. Ct. 2131 7 1 2 P 
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse 
Elecs., Inc. 
136 S. Ct. 1923 9 3 0 P 
Kimble v. Marvel Ent., 
LLC 
135 S. Ct. 2401 6 0 3 P 
Commil USA, LLC v. 
Cisco Sys., Inc. 
135 S. Ct. 1920 6 0 2 P 
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc. 
135 S. Ct. 831 7 0 2 P 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
Int’l 
134 S. Ct. 2347 9 3 0 P 
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig In-
struments, Inc. 
134 S. Ct. 2120 9 0 0 P 
Limelight Networks, Inc. 
v. Akamai Techs., Inc. 
134 S. Ct. 2111 9 0 0 P 
Octane Fitness, LLC v. 
ICON Health Fitness, Inc. 
134 S. Ct. 1749 9 0 0 P 
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare 
Health Mgmt. Sys. 
134 S. Ct. 1744 9 0 0 P 
Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Mirowski Family Ven-
tures, LLC 
134 S. Ct. 843 9 0 0 P 
Ass’n Molecular Pathol-
ogy v. Myriad Genetics, 
Inc. 
133 S. Ct. 2107 9 1 0 P 
Bowman v. Monsanto Co. 133 S. Ct. 1761 9 0 0 P 
Gunn v. Minton 568 U.S. 251 9 0 0 P 
Kappos v. Hyatt 566 U.S. 431 9 2 0 P 
Caraco Pharma. Labs. v. 
Novo Nordisk 
566 U.S. 399 9 1 0 P 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. 
v. Prometheus Labs. 
566 U.S. 66 9 0 0 P 
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. 564 U.S. 91 7 3|1 0 P 
Stanford Univ. v. Roche 
Molecular Sys. 
563 U.S. 776 7 1 2 P 
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Global-Tech Appliances, 
Inc. v. SEB S.A. 
563 U.S. 754 8 0 1 P 
Bilski v. Kappos 561 U.S. 593 9 4 0 P 
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF 
Bio, Inc.* 
556 U.S. 635 9 1|1|2 0 P 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. 
LG Elecs., Inc. 
553 U.S. 617 9 0 0 P 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T 550 U.S. 437 7 3 1 P 
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc. 
550 U.S. 398 9 0 0 P 
MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc. 
549 U.S. 118 8 0 1 P 
Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite 
Labs.* 
548 U.S. 124 5 0 3 P 
eBay Inc. v. Mer-
cExchange, LLC 
547 U.S. 388 9 3|4 0 P 
Unitherm Food Sys. v. 
Swift-Eckrich, Inc.* 
546 U.S. 394 7 0 2 P 
Merck KGaA v. Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd. 
545 U.S. 193 9 0 0 P 
Holmes Group, Inc. v. 
Vornado Air Circulation 
Sys. 
535 U.S. 826 6 3 0 P 
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki 
Co. 
535 U.S. 722 9 0 0 P 
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l 
534 U.S. 124 6 1 2 P 
Nelson v. Adams USA, 
Inc. 
529 U.S. 460 9 0 0 P 
Florida Prepaid Postsec-
ondary Edu. Exp. Bd. v. 
Coll. Sav. Bank 
527 U.S. 627 5 0 4 P 
Dickinson v. Zurko 527 U.S. 150 6 0 3 P 
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs. 525 U.S. 55 9 0 0 P 
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. 
Hilton Davis Chem. 
520 U.S. 17 9 2 0 P 
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Markman v. Westview In-
struments, Inc. 
517 U.S. 370 9 0 0 P 
Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. 
Ink 
547 U.S. 28 8 0 0 P 
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Win-
terboer* 
513 U.S. 179 8 0 1 P 
Matal v. Tam 137 S. Ct. 1744 8 4 0 T 
B&B Hardware, Inc. v. 
Hargis Indus., Inc. 
135 S. Ct. 1293 7 1 2 T 
Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana 
Bank 
135 S. Ct. 907 9 0 0 T 
POM Wonderful LLC v. 
Coca-Cola Co. 
134 S. Ct. 2228 8 0 0 T 
Lexmark Int’l v. Static 
Control Components, Inc. 
134 S. Ct. 1377 9 0 0 T 
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc. 568 U.S. 85 9 4 0 T 
KP Permanent Make-Up, 
Inc. v. Lasting Impression 
I, Inc. 
543 U.S. 111 9 0 0 T 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp. 
539 U.S. 23 8 0 0 T 
Moseley v. V Secret Cata-
logue, Inc. 
537 U.S. 418 9 1 0 T 
Cooper Indus. v. Leather-
man Tool Grp. 
532 U.S. 424 7 1|1 1 T 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. 
Marketing Displays, Inc. 
532 U.S. 23 9 0 0 T 
Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara 
Bros., Inc. 
529 U.S. 205 9 0 0 T 
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary 
Edu. Exp. Bd. 
527 U.S. 666 5 0 4 T 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson 
Prods. 
514 U.S. 159 9 0 0 T 
* These cases are not included in footnote 8 of the Waxman article. 
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APPENDIX B 
Below are two citation maps using the citations from subsets of the 1947–2017 
data. Each map covers a 20-year period and shows the cases with the top 100 au-
thority scores for that period. The first covers 1960 to 1979, the second covers 1980 
to 1999. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 1: Top 100 Authority Scores, 1960–1979 
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Appendix B 2: Top 100 Authority Scores, 1980–1999 
